

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 21, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending January 21, 2000

DNFSB Activity Summary: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh were on site all week.

Authorization Basis Issues: Two recent events highlight authorization basis issues that may carry wide-ranging implications for the Pantex site:

ALO-AO-MHC-2000-02: On Monday, an “anomaly” in the performance of a Radiation Alarms and Monitoring System (RAMS) surveillance led to the discovery that a critical safety system interlock was not wired per the drawings. Investigation has revealed that:

- 1] confusion exists among both crafts and facility management personnel with regard to the boundary between critical safety systems and balance-of-plant systems;
- 2] facility management is authorizing changes in equipment configuration without requiring prior reviews of drawings;
- 3] facility systems engineering is making independent determinations of the intent of Critical Safety System Manual (CSSM) basis statements (e.g., B.24), not necessarily in alignment with the DOE-approved requirements, and publishing surveillance procedures and guidance designed to satisfy their determination instead of the requirements; and
- 4] the basis statement itself appears to be flawed.

ALO-AO-MHC-2000-??: No occurrence report has yet been issued, but the use of W62 tooling in a [potentially] unapproved configuration [see last week’s Site Representative letter] has led to the identification of additional tooling configurations for which:

- 1] accountability for configuration control has never been established, and
- 2] drawings and procedures for assembly/inspection have never been developed.

Perhaps most distressing was the fact that, with regard to both events, M&H senior management did not recognize their significance. Further, AAO NES personnel initially advised against reporting the second event at all, considering it trivial. M&H senior management continues to argue that the RAMS surveillance failure was not, in fact, a failure, and that the “intent” of the basis statements had been satisfied, despite the fact that physical events required by the basis did not occur during this surveillance, or during the previous 4 monthly surveillances [Sept-Dec].^[II.A]

W62 D&I Program: Operations on the first 2 units continued this week. Both units have been processed through initial mechanical disassembly operations, leak checks, and radiography. An M&H conduct-of-operations mentor and a team of AAO Facility Representatives and Production Operations Team staff continued to oversee these activities.^[II.A]

Lightning Issues: The Lightning JCO became effective 0001 Wednesday, January 19th.^[II.A]

W87 Armed MSAD Operations: AAO completed its limited scope RA on the W87 Armed MSAD Operations on Wednesday. The final report identified 3 pre-start findings, 2 of which were corrected before the RA concluded. The 3rd finding involved PT certifications to conduct armed MSAD operations, as differentiated from certification to work on the W87. The report also identified 3 post-start findings. Closure packages, an ABCD change, and the Authorization Agreement/M&H Readiness to Proceed memorandum were being processed Friday, and work on the first armed MSAD unit will commence once signatures are obtained.^[II.A]

Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP): On Tuesday, the ANRCP announced that DOE had withdrawn funding for the center. Reportedly, the \$5M originally slated for ANRCP this fiscal year was being reprogrammed in support of the Pantex budget.^[II.A]